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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NORTH-SOUTH TRADE
ABSTRACT
We study the incentive that a government in the South has to protect
the intellectual property rights of Northern firms, and the consequences of
the decision taken by the South for welfare in the North and for efficiency
of the world equilibrium. We conduct our analysia in the context of a com-
petition between a single Northern producer and a single Southern producer
selling some good to an integrated world market. In this competition, only
the Northern firm has the ability to conduct R&D in order to lower its prod-
uction costs, but the Southern firm can imitate coatleasly if patent protec-
tion for proceaa innovationa is not enforced by the government of the South.
We find that the interests of the North and the South generally conflict
in the matter of protection of intellectual property, with the South bene-
fitting from the ability to pirate technology and the North harmed by such
actions. A strong system of intellectual property rights may or may not
enhance world efficiency.
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The issue of intellectual property rights has become a contentious one
indeed in recent trade relations between North and South. In the North,
producers of new knowledge and ideas rely on protection in the forms of
patents, copyrights and trademarks to enable them to appropriate some of the
benefits from investment in research and development. The Northern
governments have responded to pleas for assistance from their corporate
sectors in the face of billions of dollars of lost revenue and profits from
piracy and counterfeiting1 by applying pressure on the South to provide
greater enforcement of property rights and by pushing for new codes of
international behavior.2 At the urging of the United States, for example, the
parties to the GATT established as one of the fourteen negotiating groups of
the Uruguay Round one charged "to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as
appropriate new rules and disciplines regarding international enforcement of
intellectual property rights" (Baldwin, 1988, p.65). The South, for its part,
manifests almost total dependency on the North for the technologies needed for
growth and development. These countries fear exploitation at the hands of
innovative firms in the North in view of their weak bargaining position. They
have been quite reluctant to accede to Northern demands for strengthening of
standards on protection of intellectual property (GAO, 1987).
The welfare economics of intellectual property rights in a closed-economy
setting are reasonably well understood. A fundamental tension exists between
the social desirability of widespread dissemination of available know-how and
the need for society to provide adequate rewards to purveyors of new
information. The tension stems from the public-good nature of most forms of
knowledge; once generated, knowledge can be used simultaneously by many
parties besides the original creator at zero or minimal additional cost. This2
consideration argues against protection of intellectual property, since the
granting of property rights can only diminish the efficiency of use of a given
knowledge base. But absent some form of protection, private agents will have
little reason to invest their resources to generate new information and
technologies. The socially optimal degree of protection of intellectual
property requires a balancing of these fundamentally opposing objectives (see
Nordhaus, 1969). Most governments have chosen to award limited market power
(in the form of narrowly prescribed patents, copyrights and trademarks) to
innovators as a compromise solution in which some static misallocation is
accepted as the cost of preserving dynamic incentives.
In a world economy inhabited by sovereign governments, the issue of
protection of intellectual property becomes all the more complex. The
globally efficient degree of protection need not serve the separate interests
of the individual governments that must enforce property rights. In
particular, one would suspect that national well-being is maximized by a
higher degree of protection of intellectual property in countries that develop
new technologies and stand to earn monopoly rents from their application than
in countries that only consume the goods and services that are produced using
new ideas. But conflict of interest between governments is by no means
inevitable. As an extreme example, suppose no product development would take
place in an industry absent adequate protection against piracy and infringe-
ment. Then a country with no capability to conduct R&D would nonetheless
benefit from enforcement of patent and copyright laws insofar as its consumers
stand to capture some surplus from any new products marketed within its
borders. Indeed the U.S. government, in its discussions with trade partner
governments in the South, has sought to emphasize the stake that the latter3
have in the intellectual property rights system (see GAO, 1987, pp.43-44).
In this paper, we study the welfare economics of patent protection in a
North-South trading environment.3 We suppose that initially a Northern firm
and a Southern firm have access to an "old" technology to produce a good that
is demanded in both countries. The Northern firm alone also has the ability
to devote resources to an R&D project in order to improve the production
technology. If foreign intellectual property rights are protected by the
government in the South, then the Northern firm will gain via its R&D efforts
a competitive advantage over its Southern rival. It can exploit this
advantage in the ensuing international oligopolistic competition by capturing
an increased share of the market, or, in some circumstances, by licensing its
superior technology to its rival. If alternatively, the government in the
South fails to enforce patent protection over the new production process, then
the Southern firm will be able to pirate the innovative technology and can
once again become an equal competitor in the international marketplace. This
prospect, we assume, is well understood by the Northern firm, which then sets
its R&D outlays accordingly.
We investigate the extent to which patent protection by the government of
the South adds to social welfare in each country separately, and in the world
as a whole.In our model, global patent protection serves to stimulate
innovation, so that production costs are lower (for at least the Northern
firm) in the sales-stage equilibrium. This effect alone acts to the benefit
of both countries. Against this is the fact that enforcement of patent
protection mitigates, and in some cases eliminates, oligopolistic competition,
to the detriment of welfare in both countries. Finally, the presence or
absence of protection of intellectual property in the South has implications4
for the international distribution of income, as the Northern firm captures a
greater share of extra-normal industry profits when rights are protected than
it does when infringement takes place.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we develop the model described above, and compare levels of welfare in each
country with and without Southern protection for Northern intellectual
property. We maintain the assumption, in this section, that international
licensing arrangements between horizontal competitors are infeasible. In
Section III, we introduce the possibility of licensing, ask when it will take
place, and then re-examine the welfare comparisons of the protection and no-
protection regimes. We discuss some implications of our analysis for current
international economic relations in the concluding section.
II. Patent Protection When Licensin2 is Infeasible
We consider a linear-quadratic Cournot duopoly in an integrated world
economy. Initially, one firm in the North and one firm in the South can
produce some homogenous good at constant marginal cost, a. The Northern firm
now faces an opportunity to devote resources to a deterministic R&D project in
order to improve upon the existing production technology. The firm can
achieve a coat reduction of amount & by spending &2/i on process innovation.
Letting R denote its research outlay, its post-innovation marginal cost of
production will be4
(1) C(R) —a-(iR)"2 , Ra2/
Final marginal cost in the South will depend upon whether or not theS
Northern firm's patent rights to its innovative production process are
protected by the government of the South, and on whether or not the Southern
firm is able and willing to negotiate a licensing agreement with its Northern
rival. We assume throughout this section that the complexity of the
technology and the attendant difficulties in writing an enforceable contract
preclude any licensing agreements. Then, if property rights are protected,
the Southern fin's cost of production remains c —a.If, alternatively, the
government of the South fails to enforce the Northern firm's patent rights,
the Southern firm will be able to imitate the innovative technology. To make
our arguments as sharp as possible, we suppose that the cost of reverse
engineering is negligible.5 Then absent protection for intellectual property
marginal production costs in the South are equal to those in the North.
After the Northern firm completes its R&D project and the Southern firm
imitates if possible, the two firms engage in Cournot (quantity-setting)
competition. We adopt a linear form for (inverse) demand in the integrated
world market, and choose unita so that this curve has a slope of one. Then
(2) P—fl-(y+Y), fl>a,
where P is the market-clearing price of the good and y and Y are the
quantities sold by the Southern and Northern firms, respectively. We assume
as well that at every price a constant fraction 1/9 of demand originates in
the marketplace of the South. This implies an inverse demand function in the
South of p(q) —- Oq,where q is the quantity sold there, and also that the
South will enjoy a fraction 1/9 of total world consumer surplus at any
equilibrium price.6
A. Prooertv Rizhts Violated
We begin by solving the model under the assumption that the government of
the South fails to protect the intellectual property rights of the Northern
firm. Then the ultimate market structure is one of symmetric duonoly with
common costs C—c. These of course depend on the prior R&Ddecisionof the
Northern firm. As is well known, the Cournot equilibrium levels of output in
this instance are y —Y—(fi-C)/3and the equilibrium price is P —(+2C)/3.
We assume that, at the R&D phase, the Northern firm correctly foresees
the implications of its actions for the subsequent product-market competition.
That is, we seek a dynamic equilibrium that satisfies the sub-game-perfection
constraint. The problem facing the Northern firm in the first stage of the
game is to choose R to maximize total profits
(3) Z(R) —[p - a÷(7R)U2]-R
where the expression for operating profits in (3) represents the product of




fromwhence we derive profits for each firm:
(Sn) Z —_______
(5s) z —9(p)2
(9)2Consumer surplus, S and a, in each country is the area between the inverse






Finally,total surplus in each country, W and w, is the sum of consumer
surplus and producer surplus, or





If the government of the South does indeed prevent its local firm from
infringing upon the patent rights of the Northern innovator, then the
duopolists bear different marginal costs at the time that they meet in the
product market. In this case, three types of equilibria may arise, depending
upon the size of the parameter 7 describing the effectiveness of R&D in
reducing production costs. For small values of i the R&D efforts of the
Northern firm will be modest, and asymmetric duoo1v will characterize the
final stage of competition. For large values of the Northern firm will find8
itoptimal to reduce its costs substantially, so much so that it will enjoy an
unfettered monopoly position in the product market. Finally, when y takes on
intermediate values, the Northern firm will act strategically to induce exit
by its rival (see Dixit, 1980). Then its final position in the product market
will be one of monopoly, but the firm will find itself constrained to choose a
level of R&D spending sufficiently large to guarantee non-positive profits for
its rival. We shall refer to this last market structure as one of strateaic
oredation. We proceed now to find optimal levels of R&D, and equilibrium
profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare for each of these scenarios, and
to delimit the values of -forwhich each applies.
Consider first the output stage of an asymmetric duopoly with costs C and
c. The two first-order conditions equating perceived marginal revenues to
marginal costs imply a Cournot equilibrium with Y —( - 2C+c)/3and y —
(fi - 2c+C)/3,and an associated equilibrium price P —( +C+c)/3.
Anticipating these outcomes, the Northern firm chooses P. to maximize
(8) Z(R) — -a+27h/2Rl/Z
2
-R
The optimal choice of R when duopolistic competition is foreseen satisfies
P.—4(fi)2
(94)2
nut,with this level of R&D, output by the Southern firm remains positive if
and only if <3/2.So, y <3/2is necessary for the duopoly outcome to
obtain.













(l2s) w —(fl-a)2[.(3.2y)2+ 2(3--i)2]
9(9-4i)
Nowsuppose, for the moment, that the Northern firmwereto face no
competition whatsoever. Then its jointly optimal choices of output and
research would be Y —2(fl-a)/(4-i)and K —-y(fl-a)2/(4-i)2.When would these
choices represent an equilibrium despite potential competition from the firm
in the South? If, at the implied monopoly price P —[fl(2+i)+2a/(4-1)the10
Southern firm could not cover its production cost a, then the rival would
choose to exit the industry. From this, we see that unconstrained monopoly









Finally, for values of E [3/2,2], the monopoly choice of research
spending invites competition from the Southern rival, whereas the optimal
choice of R&D from (9) more than suffices to guarantee the rival's exit from
the market. For these intermediate values ofthe Northern firm conducts
just enough R&D to guarantee y —0;i.e. it drives its own cost to 2a-fl and
the price to m. This requires a research outlay of R —(-a)2/-yand yields
profits equal to
(16n) Z —iji)C8a)2




Inthe South, we have, in this case, z —0and
(17s) w -s-(Q)2
Itis a simple matter to check that, for all -y <3/2,Northern profits from
(iOn) exceed those from (16n), so that -y < 3/2 is both necessary and
sufficient for the duopoly outcome to obtain, Strategic predation occurs only
for values of 'y [3/2,21.
C. Welfare Comoarisons
We are now prepared to compare levels of welfare in each country and for
the world as a whole across regimes when the government of the South does and
does not protect the intellectual property rights of the Northern firm. We
begin with the South. For -y < 3/2, the relevant welfare expressions are those
in (7s) and (l2s). Subtracting one from the other, we find
(19s) sgn (w' -w)—sgn(-4868 +40597+l08-y-84972-48i2+
493+2), e(0,3/2)
where superscripts NP" and 'P' have been used to indicate the regimes without
protection of property rights and with protection, respectively. In general,
the expression in (l9s) is of ambiguous sign. But the right-hand side of12
(19s) is positive when 9 —9/8for all -e(0,3/2) and the right-hand side is
increasing in 9 for all y in this range. From this we conclude that the South
achieves higher national welfare when it neglects to protect intellectual
property rights if a duopoly outcome will result under protection and if ita
share in world consumption does not exceed 88 percent.
Next consider the range of parameter values for which strategic predation
is the outcome under patent protection. We subtract (14a) from (7s) to find
(20s) sgn (NP -w}—sgn(18(9+2) -(97)2(, -yE [3/2,2]
The expression on the right-hand side of (20s) also is positive for all 9 >
9/8 and also increases with 9. Hence, when atrategic predation will occur
under protection, a Southern consumption share of less than 88 percent is
sufficient for the South to prefer non-protection.
Finally, we consider the range of parameter values for which the North
would capture a monopoly position if its property rights were respected.
Recall that this case arises when R&D productivity is especially high. The
relevant welfare expressions are (7s) and (17a), and we find
(2la) sgn (w2 -w2}—sgn(99(y4)2 + 2(8i254i+63)( , e[2,4]
For -y near 2, this expression remains positive unless the consumption share of
the South is very high. But for -y large (near 4), the expression is negative
for all 9 > 1. Thus, we find that protection of foreign intellectual property
can benefit the South, but only when R&D is highly productive and the country
stands to gain much on the consumption side from the fruits of the Northern13
firm's research efforts.
In Figure 1, we have plotted the full range of permissible parameter
values for y and 1/6. In the figure, we show the combinations of parameter
values for which protection and non-protection best serve the selfish
interests of the South. We see from the figure that the South will generally
prefer to "look the other way" when patent infringement occurs, except in
cases where its consumers absorb much of the world's output of the good
subject to cost reduction or when the cost savings to be reaped from
innovation are quite dramatic.
What then are the interests of the North?When we compare Northern
welfare levels under protection and no-protection we find that, no matter what
the value of y and hence the market structure that would prevail with
protection, the North always benefits form having its firm's property rights
respected in the South.8 Evidently, the consumption gain from increased
competition can never outweigh the profit-distribution effect and the &D-
incentive effect. We conclude that conflict of interest between the North and
the South in regard to the system of intellectual property rights is the rule
rather than the exception in our model.
When international conflict exists, it is natural to ask whether there
are potential gains from cooperation. In the present context we might wonder
whether the North could bribe the South to enforce patent protection in cases
where protection was not in the narrowly-defined self interest of the latter.
A world system of protected intellectual property rights would result from
efficient bar2ainina with comvensation, for example, if the North's gains from
enforcement exceeded the South's losses. To investigate this issue, we define
world welfare, ) —W+w,and compare levels of 0 across regimes.14
Suppose first that available productivity gains from R&D are modest;
i.e.-y <3/2.We have in this case
(19w) sgn (tfi - — sgn(81 -1261+4012-2) , yE (0,3/2)
The expression on the right-hand side of (19w) is positive in the relevant
range for all y .875 and is negative for all .876. Thus, protection of
foreign intellectual property rights in the South indeed advances global
efficiency if the prospects for productivity gain through R&D are sufficiently
bright, but for modest potential advances in knowledge world welfare actually
is higher when the South jj to enforce patent protection. Evidently, for
small innovations, the benefit from the increased competition that results
when diffusion takes place outweighs the cost in terms of dampened incentives
for R&D investment.
For larger values ofsuch that the Southern firm would exit the market
absent the ability to infringe upon the Northern firm's patent, protection by
the South of intellectual property rights always enhances global efficiency.
Straightforward computation reveals that O > cPfor> 3/2. Our analysis
suggests, therefore, that intellectual property rights ought to be strongly
protected in highly innovative industries, but that the argument for pro-
tection is lass compelling when technological advances are likely to be small.
III. Patent Protection With Potential Licensing
Until this point, we have excluded the possibility that, after the
conclusion of its R&D project, the Northern firm might elect to license its
superior technology to its rival in the South. We justified this exclusion15
with reference to the costliness of writing enforceable contracts in some
situations. But obviously there are circumstances where contracting
considerations do not rule out licensing. Katz and Shapiro (1985) have
studied the incentives for the sharing of technologies among horizontal
competitors in such circumstances. We now adopt their approach to introduce
the potential for licensing into our model, and then re-examine the
international issues at hand.
A. Licensina Eauilibria
As in Katz and Shapiro (1985), we suppose that licensing contracts can
only be signed after research and development has been completed. It seems
likely that if, instead, contracts were to be negotiated at some prior stage,
and if they called for the sharing of (some amount of) information which at
the time was not yet available to either party, then the resulting contracts
would be extremely difficult to enforce. We add a third (licensing) stage to
our game, one that takes place before the sales competition but subsequent to
the commitment of R by the Northern firm. We also rule out, with reference to
the antitrust laws applicable in most countries, any contracts that limit
competition at the sales stage. We limit attention to contracts calling for a
fixed licencing fee.9
When licensing agreements must be reached after R&D has been completed
and imitation is costless, no agreements are possible in the absence of patent
protection in the South. The Southern firm would never be willing to pay a
positive fee to use the Northern firm's technology if it were possible for the
firm to copy that technology at no cost. So, in this sub-section, we limit
attention to situations where the South provides protection for intellectual
property. We re-introduce the alternative possibility of no protection only16
when we are ready to perform the regime comparisons.
The licensing of technology between horizontsl competitors requires:
(i) the existence of joint gsins from sharing; and (ii) the resolution of a
bilateral bargaining problem. Given the existence of potential gains,
licensing might not take place if the two parties to the negotiation had
asymmetric information about their separate interests and attributes. Since
we have nothing to add to the voluminous literature on bargaining, we choose
the simplest possible specification of this aspect of the model. We suppose
that licensing will take place under patent protection whenever the joint
profits of the two firms with licensing exceeds joint profits in the absence
of licensing. We assume, moreover, that the Northern firm captures a fraction
a of the gains from trade, and treat a as an exogenous parameter throughout
our analysis.
More formally, let (R) be the levels of profits that the
Northern and Southern firms would obtain in the absence of any licensing
agreement, and let Z(R) and z(R) be profit levels (not including any licensing
fee) if technology sharing takes place. Then we assume that licensing will
occur subsequent to a research effort at intensity R if and only if Z(R)+z(R)
￿Z(R)+z(R),and that in such cases the Southern firm pays a fee
(22) 1(t) —(R)-Z(R)+a[Z(R)+z(R)-Z(R)-z(R)]
for the right to use the Northern firm's superior technology. With this fee,
the Northern firm's total profits, Z(R) +F(R),are the sum of hypothetical
profits in the absence of an agreement, Z(R), and that firm's share a of the
gains from trade.17
Katz and Shapiro (1985) have proven that, in models such as this one,
licensing wili not take place if the potential licensor would enjoy a monopoly
position in the product market were it to exclude its rival from the superior
technology. For this reason, we restrict our search for licensing equilibria
to values of & such that asymmetric duopoly would be the outcome absent any
agreement. For these values of R, the relevant expressions for (R) and (R)
are those that would arise in an asymmetric Cournot equilibrium with
respective costs C —- (iR)h/2and c —o,while Z(R) and z(R) are those that
arise in a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with costs C —c—a-(yR)'12.
Inserting the appropriate terms in (22), we derive
(23) F(R) —(2+2a)($a)7hI2RZ+(3-3c)7R
9
Assuming that licensing will take place, the optimal choice of R for the
Northern firm is the one that maximizes Z(R) +F(R).The first-order
condition for this problem yields
(24) &y(2+u)2($a)2
[9(3a4) 12




There remains the question of whether the Northern firm will select a
value of R that yields licensing in the post-R&D licensing equilibrium as part
of its globally optimal strategy. The firm could instead choose a higher
level of R&D such that no licensing agreement would be reached once the
research phase had been completed. The profits it could earn by doing so
never exceed those given in (lOn), corresponding to maximal profits in an
asymmetric duopoly situation without licensing. In making its choice of R,
the Northern firm compares the right-hand sides of (lOn) and (25n). This
comparison yields a critical value of 1 as a function of a, y*C(a) with G'>O,
such that licensing takes place in equilibrium if and only if y C 1*.
Examining this function, we find that when -y > 1.406 licensing never takes
place (i.e., no matter what the value of a), whereas if C 1.285 licensing
always will occur with protection. For values of -y between 1.285 and 1.406,
licensing is more likely to result the larger is aJ°
For values of y such that licensing would not take place in the sub-game
perfect equilibrium, the analysis of intellectual property rights is exactly
as in-Section II. So we restrict our attention here to those cases where, in
the presence of patent protection, a licensing agreement would be reached.
These cases are of special interest, because they imply that international
technology transfer takes place in any event, either by commercial arrangement
if patent protection is provided by the government of the South, or by piracy
if not.
Using (24) and our formulae for Cournot equilibrium outputs and prices,
we can calculate profits for the Southern firm and consumer surplus levels in









We calculate total welfare in each country, as before, by summing the consumer
and producer surplus measures in (25) and (26).
8. Welfare Comoarisons
We now are prepared to compare levels of welfare achieved under
protection of foreign intellectual property in the South with those that arise
when no protection is provided, in situAtions where protection gives rise to
an equilibrium with international licensing of the new technology. This
analysisinvolves comparison of (7i) with the sumof(25i) and (26i), for
i—s,n. Since the general expressions are quite complicated and provide
limited intuition, we proceed by focusing on several special cases.
The first case that we consider arises when r—l. In this case, the
Northern firm enjoys all the bargaining power in the licensing negotiations
and extracts all the surplus from any agreement. We find
(27s) sgn (w -w)—sgn($(2-y-9) ++ 9)
In Figure 2, we show the combinations of y and 1/9 for which the right-hand
side of (27s) is positive, and those for which it is negative. We see that20
the South may benefit from protection of Northern intellectual property
rights, but only if its share in world consumption of the good is quite high.
A sufficient condition for non-protection to be the optimal strategy when a—i
is 1/9 < .59.
From the point of view of the North, we have
(27n) sgn (W -W)—sgn(y +9-169)
For -y C 1.406 (the largest value of , for which licensing takes place when
a—l), the right-hand side of (27n) always is negative. So we find again that
the North benefits from having its intellectusl property rights protected in
the South.
Next we consider the opposite extreme case where bargaining power resides
entirely with the firm in the South; i.e. ,a—0.When a—0 the South is more
likely to benefit from protecting Northern property rights than it is when
a—i, and does so whenever its consumption share exceeds one-half (see Figure
3). However, when the consumption share of the South is not large (e.g., less
than .4), the South still prefers to pirate Northern technology than to enter
into a licensing agreement in which its firm will capture all of the surplus.
This somewhat surprising result stems from the fact that the licensing fee
remains strictly positive even when a—0, end also from the differing
incentives that the Northern firm has to carry out R&D in the two situations.
Comparing welfare levels for the North, for the case when its firm's
bargaining power in the licensing negotiation is nil, we find that, for all
permissible values of a (sl) and-y (E(0,9/7)),W2 >W'.Even if the
Northern firm captures 2fl of the surplus from any licensing agreement that21
materializes between itself and its Southern rival, nonetheless the North
enjoys greater welfare when its intellectual property rights are protected by
the South.
Lastly, we consider an intermediate case where the gains from trade in
knowledge are shared equally between the two rivals; i.e., a —1/2.Figure 4
depicts the parameter values for which the South prefers protection. The
figure provides the same general message as for the more extreme cases,
inasmuch as the South benefits from protection only when its residents absorb
a large share of world output of the good. The critical values for 1/9 at
which protection becomes preferable lie between those of the earlier cases
with a—O and a—l. Also, we find as before that the North can only be harmed
by a failure of the government of the South to protect its patent rights.
Our last inquiry concerns the implications of intellectual property
rights for world welfare when protection induces a licensing agreement.
Allowing once again for an arbitrary value of a, we obtain
(29) sgn (0NP - — sgn(-729(5-a)(l+a) + 486(l-a)(2+Sa) +
lO82(l-2a)(3-5a) -l63(l-2a)2)
The expression ott the right-hand side of (29) always is negative for a E [0,1]
and y in the range where licensing obtains. Thus, contrary to our findings in
Section II where licensing was considered to be infeasible, we find now that
protection of intellectual property rights always enhances global efficiency
when trade in technology can take place. Patent protection with licensing
allows the world to enjoy both widespread dissemination of knowledge and the
benefits of more intense product-market competition, while avoiding the22
disincentive effects that plague a weak system of intellectual property-rights
where infringement on patents is pervasive.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the incentive that a government in the
South has to protect the intellectual property rights of Northern firms, and
the consequences of the decision taken by the South for welfare in the North
and for efficiency of the world equilibrium. We have conducted our partial
equilibrium analysis in the context of a competition between a single Northern
producer and a single Southern producer selling some good to an integrated
world market. In this competition, only the Northern firm has the ability to
conduct R&D in order to lower its production costs, but the Southern firm can
imitate costlessly if patent protection for process innovations is not
enforced by the government of the South.
We found that, contrary to the commonly-voiced polemic of the U.S.
government, the interests of the North and South generally conflict in this
matter of international economic relations. Unless the South comprises a
majority share of the market for the good whose technology is subject to
improvement or the prospects for cost-savings through R&D are quite
substantial, social welfare in the South will be higher when it eschews
protection of foreign intellectual property than when it succumbs to pressure
from the North. The North, on the other hand, always benefits from having the
patents of its firm respected outside its borders. Surprisingly, perhaps, the
global comparison can go either way; protection of intellectual property
rights enhances world efficiency when productivity in R&D is great, but not
when innovations are likely to be small. What is at stake here is the23
familiar conflict between the benefits of widespread diffusion of technology
and the increased competition that such diffusion entails, and the costs of
dampened incentives to generate technological breakthroughs.
Needless to say, our results hinge on the special assumptions we have
introduced. Most important, we feel, are our restriction to situations of
duopoly and our exclusion of any possibility of innovation in the South. With
more Southern firms and some scope for technological improvement there
(including improvements that only serve to move the country closer to the
world technological frontier), a strong system of protection for intellectual
property may be necessary to prevent the Southern firms from appropriating
technologies from each other. Yet some countries have been known to afford
unequal treatment to foreigners in patent enforcement procedures (see ITC,
1988, p. 3.7). So protection of domestic and foreign property need not
always go hand in hand, the provisions of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property notwithstanding.
Our findings may contain an important lesson for negotiators in the
Uruguay Round. Until now, the industrial countries have maintained the
posture that governments in the South ought to respect Northern claims for
property rights over knowledge and technology partly as a matter of moral
principle and partly in their own self interest.If, as our analysis
suggests, the South benefits by "borrowing freely from the technologies
produced in the North, then it may be more productive for the Northern
governments to abandon this high moral position and treat the issue of
intellectual property as they would any other one of conflicting national
interests. In particular, if protection of intellectual property does indeed
enhance global efficiency, as our analysis shows to be the case at least for24
substantial innovations, then the North ought to be willing and able to
compensate the South for any losses that it would incur in the course of
providing such protection. The format of the GATT negotiations presumably
presents an ideal opportunity for effecting such compensation as Southern
concessions on this issue might readily be exchanged for Northern concessions
on some others (greater market access for Southern exports?)25
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Endnotes
1. Responding to a survey conducted by the International Trade Commission
(1988), 101 U.S. corporations cited lost export sales in 1986 due to
inadequate foreign protection of intellectual property of $6.16 billion.
sixty-four respondents claimed lost sales in the United states totaling $1.80
billion. An additional $3.11 billion of lost royalty payments was noted by
104 respondents to the ITC survey. The ITC estimates that, for the companies
in its sample, sales of infringing goods may have represented an average
profit reduction of 10 percent in 1986. The International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition estimates total annual losses of domestic and foreign
sales by U.S. firma due to inadequate protection of intellectual property of
approximately $20 billion (see Benko, 1987).
2. Further to its survey of U.S. corporations, the ITC (1988) reports that 122
companies cited fifty-four countries as having inadequate protection of patent
rights for foreignera, while eighty-four respondents cited fifty-two countries
as providing insufficient protection for copyrights. The countries most
commonly cited in this regard are Mexico, Taiwan, Brazil and Korea. For
diacuasion of the alleged inadequacies of foreign protection of U.S.
intellectual property, see ITC (1988, Ch.3).
3. For an analysis of iasuea arising from foreign counterfeiting of domestic
trademarka, ace Groaaman and Shapiro (1988a, l988b).
4. We use an uppercaae Roman letter to denote a variable relating to the North
and the corresponding lowercase letter for the analogoua variable for the
South. Greek letters are reserved for parameters.
5. For an analysis of a (closed-economy) R&D game with costly imitation, see
Katz and Shapiro (1987).
6. We assume in all cases that a is sufficiently large so that the non-
negativity constraint on c does not bind.
7. We restrict attention to y C4,so that R&D remains finite at the monopoly
optimum.
8. We compare (7n) with (l2n), (l7n), and (l5n), for values of -y that give
rise to duopoly, strategic predation and monopoly, respectively. In each case
it is possible to show that w -W>0at 9—1, and that the derivative of
this difference with respect to 9 is positive for all y in the relevant range.
9. As Katz and Shapiro discuas, the firms will prefer to negotiate contracts
calling for royalties on a per-unit output basis, because such provisions can
be used to enforce collusive arrangements in the product market. However,
these typea of contracts might be difficult to monitor and enforce, and might
also bring the firms into conflict with the antitrust authorities.27
10. These findings accord with the more general results reported in Katz and
Shapiro (1985). They show for general demand functions and an arbitrary form
of static, oligopolistic competition (satisfying certain intuitive conditions)
a small innovation always is licensed if the two firms initially share common
costs, and that the set of parameters for which licensing obtains is strictly
smaller than the set that gives rise to monopoly in the absence of licensing.FIGURE 1
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